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THE KIRBY COP-OUT: HOW STRICT ADHERENCE TO KIRBY’S 




Imagine your family maintains the most prestigious art gallery in 
America for the sole purpose of collecting and preserving profound 
artwork. Although the gallery has received countless submissions from 
artists, the only submissions that were truly profound and worth 
memorializing happened to be oil paintings, with very few pastel 
paintings. Then one day, an artist arrived with a sketch that resembled a 
painting already in your collection, but nowhere near the quality of the 
painting it was modeled after. Although the artist’s sketch would be 
excluded solely because it was not as profound as the rest, you politely 
inform the artist that your gallery only accepts oil paintings. Angrily, the 
sketch-artist points to the pastel painting on the wall to counter your 
claim, to which you respond, “That was an exception, but it is still a 
painting nonetheless.” After realizing how easily you dismissed the 
disgruntled artist, you announce a new rule: in order to be memorialized 
in the gallery, the art must be an oil painting. From that day on, you 
continue to reject artists for submitting subpar works of art, but if it is a 
close call you rely on the bright-line rule announced to the sketch-artist 
many years ago. The only downside to your rule is that sometimes you 
have to turn away truly profound art, deserving to be memorialized, that 
is not an oil-painting because you have relied on the rule to reject so many 
others. 
In Sixth-Amendment jurisprudence, the right to effective assistance of 
counsel at trial provides an indispensable safeguard in the American 
criminal justice system. Its rationale is straightforward: the average 
American does not possess the expertise to effectively defend against 
organized, well-funded prosecutorial forces that are designed to convict 
those accused of a crime. The courts have recognized that in order to 
preserve the right to counsel at trial, the right needs to be extended to 
certain pre-trial confrontations. Similar to the hypothetical gallery, all of 
the pre-trial confrontations happened to occur after formal judicial 
proceedings had been initiated, but the confrontations were never deemed 
a necessary condition to invoke the right to counsel. Then, in Kirby v. 
Illinois, the Supreme Court of the United States made a novel decision. 
The Court found that because case law showed that every extension of the 
right to counsel in pre-trial confrontations has been needed after formal 
1
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judicial proceedings were initiated, formal initiation of judicial 
proceedings is a necessary condition for the right to counsel to be 
implicated. 1 
Just as the hypothetical gallery owner could have rejected the sketch 
for not being worth memorializing, so too could the Court have rejected 
Kirby’s claim by holding that the Sixth Amendment did not apply during 
criminal investigations.2 However, neither the gallery owner nor the Court 
made this decision. Since the Court’s decision in Kirby, bright-line 
attachment continues to be used as a way to dismiss claims that invoke 
core Sixth Amendment principles, and meritless claims, alike. Turner v. 
United States3 is the judicial equivalent to the gallery owner turning away 
an artist’s submission that was worthy of being memorialized among 
other profound artwork simply because of an arbitrary rule. The Sixth 
Circuit denied the defendant in Turner the right to counsel because the 
formalistic, bright-line attachment rule announced in Kirby continues to 
trump the underlying principles of the Sixth Amendment. Instead of 
determining whether pre-indictment plea negotiations implicate the rights 
the Sixth Amendment seeks to protect, the majority used Kirby and its 
progeny as a cop-out to quickly deny Turner the right to counsel instead 
of implicating an in-depth Sixth Amendment analysis.  
This Article examines Sixth Amendment caselaw and concludes that 
the right to effective assistance of counsel should be extended to Turner, 
and other similarly situated defendants, during pre-indictment plea 
negotiations. Part II summarizes the Sixth Circuit’s decision denying 
Turner’s right to counsel, the introduction of the attachment rule, and how 
other Courts of Appeals have interpreted Kirby’s bright-line attachment 
rule. Part III first analyzes why Kirby is a constitutional outlier that 
undermines the spirit of the Sixth Amendment and has produced unsettled 
caselaw in this area. Part III next discusses how the right to counsel, 
properly understood, should extend to pre-indictment plea negotiations. 
Lastly, this comment will show that even under a bright-line rule, 
Turner’s right to counsel attached when the government extended a 
formal plea offer. Finally, Part IV summarizes the main arguments 
discussed in this Article and offers insight into the implications of the 
Sixth Amendment attachment issue for pre-indictment plea negotiations. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This Part summarizes the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Turner, 
 
 1. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
 2. See id. at 690-91. 
 3. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert, denied, No. 18-106, 
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019). 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/10
2019] THE KIRBY COP-OUT 341 
emphasizing the judges’ different viewpoints. Then, this Part traces the 
development of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence by addressing the 
underlying principles of why the right to counsel is crucial to the 
American criminal justice system and highlighting the cases that have 
extended the right to counsel to certain “critical stages” of the adversarial 
process. Next, this Part discusses how the bright-line “attachment” 
component was introduced in Kirby. This Part concludes by presenting 
cases from circuits outside of the Sixth Circuit that deviate from Kirby’s 
bright-line rule. 
A. Turner v. United States 
In March 2018, the Sixth Circuit reheard Turner, en banc,4 to decide 
whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to pre-indictment 
plea negotiations.5 This case arose from Turner’s motion to vacate his 
conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel during plea 
negotiations for his federal charges.6  
In October 2007, Turner robbed four Memphis-area businesses at 
gunpoint and was later apprehended by a state police officer working in a 
joint federal-state task force.7 In February 2008, a grand jury indicted 
Turner on state aggravated robbery charges.8 Turner retained counsel and 
the state charges were resolved through a plea agreement in March 2009.9 
During the summer of 2008, an Assistant United States District Attorney 
(“ADA”) informed Turner’s counsel that the United States planned to 
bring federal charges for each of the four robberies.10 The ADA told 
Turner’s attorney he would offer Turner a fifteen-year sentence for his 
federal charges, conditioned on Turner accepting the offer before a federal 
indictment was returned.11 Turner did not accept the plea deal before the 
grand jury’s indictment was returned and the ADA withdrew the offer.12 
 
 
 5. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 
949 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019). This 
Article addresses the state of the Sixth Circuit’s position on the right to counsel, and how the Sixth 
Circuit’s approach should extend the right to counsel to pre-indictment plea negotiations. 
 6. Turner v. United States, 848 F.3d 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2017), aff’d on reh’g, Turner v. United 
States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 
2019). Although not addressed in this Article, the court also held Turner’s right to counsel was not 
triggered by the state indictment because he committed two separate offenses, even though the essential 
elements of the state and federal offenses were the same. Id. at 955. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. The state plea-deal is not addressed in this comment.  
 10. Id. at 769. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
3
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Turner later fired his attorney, and the best deal Turner’s new attorney 
could negotiate was a twenty-five-year sentence, which Turner 
accepted.13 
On rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that the 
right to counsel does not attach to pre-indictment negotiations.14 Turner 
argued that based on the Supreme Court’s 2012 holdings in Missouri v. 
Frye15 and Lafler v. Cooper,16 which recognized the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in post-indictment plea negotiations, the right to counsel 
should also apply to plea negotiations that occur before a defendant is 
indicted.17 The court rejected this argument, stating it is “firmly 
established” that the right to counsel attaches only at or after formal 
judicial proceedings are initiated.18 The Sixth Circuit refused Turner’s 
argument because the “Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected attempts 
by criminal defendants to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
to pre-indictment proceedings, even where the same proceedings are 
critical stages when they occur post-indictment.”19 The “critical stages” 
the court referenced were police lineups20 and interrogations:21 a right to 
counsel exists in these stages only after formal charges are brought against 
the defendant.22 
The court also rejected Turner’s argument that other circuits extend the 
right to counsel in pre-indictment adversarial confrontations.23 According 
to the majority, only one circuit has implied the right to counsel extends 
to pre-indictment plea negotiations, but that opinion was “non-
precedential and the issue of when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches was not before the court in that case.”24 The court noted that a 
minority of circuits have discussed the possibility of extending the right 
to counsel in pre-indictment proceedings, but since no circuit has 
unequivocally extended the right to pre-indictment plea negotiations, the 
court rejected the notion of a circuit split.25 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019) 
 15. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012). 
 16. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012). 
 17. Turner, 885 F.3d at 952. 
 18. Id. at 953. 
 19. Id. (emphasis added).  
 20. See infra pp. 8-9,12-13.  
 21. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (holding the right to counsel did not attach to an 
interrogation that took place the night the defendant was arrested for burglary and subsequently confessed 
to a murder that occurred a year earlier). 
 22. Turner, 885 F.3d at 953 (internal citations omitted). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 953-54 (citing United States v. Giamo, 665 F. App’x 154, 156-57 (3d. Cir 2016)). 
 25. Id. at 953 (citing Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1st Cir. 1995); see Perry v. Kemna, 
4
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Judge Clay wrote separately to express his reluctance in following the 
bright-line rule that denies Turner the right to counsel.26 Quoting his 
opinion in United States v. Moody,27 Judge Clay stated:  
“We do not favor this bright line approach because it requires that we 
disregard the cold reality that faces a suspect in pre-indictment plea 
negotiation. There is no question in our minds that at formal plea 
negotiations, where a specific sentence is offered to an offender for a 
specific offense, the adverse positions of the government and the suspect 
have solidified.”28 
While acknowledging the logic in Turner’s argument, the court noted 
that Frye and Lafler did not expressly extend the right to pre-indictment 
plea deals since the right to counsel had already attached.29 
Judge Stranch’s dissenting opinion in Turner argued that the court 
failed to perform its function while sitting en banc and that precedent did 
not require the result reached by the majority.30 According to the dissent, 
this case presented an issue that the Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed.31 Instead of engaging in a fact-specific inquiry, the majority 
followed an inapplicable bright-line approach and undermined existing 
Sixth Amendment caselaw.32 For Turner, a pre-indictment plea deal 
would be the only adversarial confrontation, yet the majority was not 
willing to extend him the right to counsel.33 Lastly, the dissent points out, 
the pre-indictment plea process was completely insulated from 
constitutional review.34 Even a defendant such as Turner, who retained 
private counsel, cannot bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.35 
B. The Sixth Amendment 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused to receive 
assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions for his or her defense.36 
The Sixth Amendment protects the fundamental notion that “if the 
constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be 
 
356 F.3d 880, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2004) (Bye, J., concurring) (collecting cases)). 
 26. Turner, 885 F.3d at 968 (Clay, J., concurring). 
 27. United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2000) (preceding Sixth Circuit decision 
declining to extend the right to counsel in preindictment plea negotiations).  
 28. Id. at 615. 
 29. Turner, 885 F.3d at 969 (Clay, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. at 977 (Stranch, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 978. 
 33. Id. at 983. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 983. 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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done.’”37 Until 1963, the right to be appointed counsel was only available 
in federal criminal prosecutions.38 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme 
Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to require that all state courts provide counsel for indigent 
citizens accused of a crime.39 The Court’s decision in Gideon extended 
the reasoning of existing precedent and was based on the notion that in 
the American adversarial system, any person who cannot afford to hire an 
attorney cannot be given a fair trial unless an attorney is provided for the 
accused.40 Further, the state’s spending of “vast sums of money to 
establish machinery to try defendants accused of a crime” requires the 
state to provide funding to protect indigent defendants’ constitutional 
rights.41 
In order to ensure Sixth Amendment protections, the Court in Gideon 
applied a practical approach to “scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of 
the accused” and determine whether presence of counsel is “necessary to 
preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial.”42 In doing so, the Court 
recognized that the spirit of the Sixth Amendment is that the average 
defendant does not possess the legal skills to effectively defend against 
the organized forces of the state and skilled prosecutors and therefore, in 
order for justice to prevail, every American has the fundamental right to 
be represented by counsel.43 
1. Critical Stages that Require the Right to Counsel 
The historical background of the Sixth Amendment suggests that the 
core purpose was to assure assistance at trial.44 In a line of cases starting 
with Powell v. Alabama, the right to counsel has been extended to critical, 
pre-trial confrontations that “require[] the guiding hand of counsel” to 
ensure the guarantee is not merely an empty promise.45 Further, the right 
to counsel being extended to pre-trial confrontations resulted from 
“changing patterns of criminal procedure and investigation that have 
tended to generate pretrial events that might appropriately be considered 
parts of the trial itself.”46 
The first prong required to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to 
 
 37. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (footnote omitted). 
 38. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (emphasis added). 
 43. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 46. Ash, 413 U.S. at 310. 
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counsel is that the proceeding must be a critical stage.47 Determining 
whether a hearing is a critical stage depends on “whether potential 
substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres . . . in the confrontation 
and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.”48 The critical stage 
has been extended from the right to counsel only at trial based on 
pragmatic considerations that “the right to use counsel at the formal trial 
(would be) a very hollow thing (if), for all practical purposes, the 
conviction is already assured by pretrial examination.”49 
To determine whether a pre-trial proceeding is a critical stage, the 
Court weighs the “usefulness of counsel” and the “dangers to the accused 
of proceeding without counsel.”50 Early Supreme Court decisions in 
United States v. Wade51 and United States v. Ash52 illustrate how the Court 
distinguishes between critical and noncritical proceedings. In Wade, the 
defendant was arrested, appointed counsel, and subjected to an 
identification lineup without notice to Wade’s attorney.53 The Court 
found that during police lineups, there was a well-known risk of law 
enforcement engaging in suggestive practices that influenced how the 
witness identified the accused, which could not be corrected at trial.54 The 
Court further found that once witnesses identified suspects in a lineup, 
they rarely second-guessed themselves, so the identification issue was 
often settled before trial.55 Since an attorney’s presence would have likely 
prevented the use of suggestive practices that carry significant 
implications at trial, the Court deemed police lineups to be a critical stage 
in Sixth Amendment right to counsel analysis.56  
Conversely, in Ash, the Court held that photo identifications were not 
a critical stage because there were “substantially fewer possibilities of 
impermissible suggestion.”57 Since photo identifications can be 
reconstructed at trial and defense counsel can effectively cross-examine 
witnesses to expose suggestive practices, the Court did not deem them to 
 
 47. Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). 
 48. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227. 
 49. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964) (alterations in original) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988) (“we have defined the scope of the right 
to counsel by a pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular 
proceeding, and the dangers to the accused of proceeding without counsel”). 
 50. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298. 
 51. See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (Gilbert was the companion case to Wade 
that also addressed police identification lineups and was decided on the same day). 
 52. Ash, 413 U.S. at 300. 
 53. Wade, 388 U.S. at 219. 
 54. Id. at 229. (“[T]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably 
accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor[.]”) (citation omitted). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 237. 
 57. Ash, 413 U.S. at 324. 
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be a critical stage.58 
In Coleman v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a pre-indictment 
hearing was a critical stage triggering the right to counsel.59 In that case, 
the state of Alabama created a preliminary hearing to determine whether 
sufficient evidence existed to warrant the state trying the case to a grand 
jury and to set bail.60 The hearing was not required to indict an accused 
and included procedural safeguards that barred testimony from hearings 
in which the accused was not represented by counsel.61 The Court did not 
address whether Alabama’s unnecessary and effectively 
nonconsequential hearing was considered a formal initiation of the 
criminal process.62 However, the accused did not have the ability to 
“realize the[] advantages of a lawyer’s assistance” before he was indicted, 
which “compell[ed] the conclusion that the Alabama preliminary hearing 
is a ‘critical stage.’”63 Specifically, during the hearing a defense attorney 
could (1) cross examine witnesses to expose errors in the state’s case; (2) 
impeach the state’s witnesses; (3) discover the case the state has against 
his client; and (4) make influential arguments regarding early psychiatric 
examinations or bail.64  
In the companion cases Frye and Lafler,65 the Supreme Court found 
that the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel was violated during the plea-bargaining process. In Frye, the 
prosecutor sent two plea offers to Frye’s attorney, but the attorney did not 
advise Frye that the offers had been made and both offers expired without 
the defendants knowledge that the offers existed.66 Frye eventually 
entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to three years in prison, which 
was greater than the plea deal Frye would have accepted but-for his 
attorney’s failure to communicate the previous offer.67 In Lafler, the 
prosecution offered to dismiss several of the defendant’s charges and 
recommend a sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five months in exchange for 
 
 58. Id. at 324-25. 
 59. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970). 
 60. Id. at 8. 
 61. Id. at 8, 9.  
 62. See id. at 9. (“[I]n cases where the accused has no lawyer at the hearing the Alabama courts 
prohibit the State’s use at trial of anything that occurred at the hearing, it does not follow that the Alabama 
preliminary hearing is not a “critical stage” of the State’s criminal process.”). 
 63. Id. at 9-10.  
 64. See id. 
 65. The main difference between the Court’s decision in Frye and Lafler is that the latter addresses 
“proper remedies” for violations, while the former does not. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 138 
(2012). Because remedies are outside the scope of this note, it will refer to the opinions collectively. 
 66. Frye, 566 U.S. at 138-39. 
 67. Id. at 139-40. (“Frye testified he would have entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor [90-day 
sentence] had he known about the offer.”). 
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a guilty plea.68 The defendant’s attorney convinced him that the 
prosecution would not be able to prove a material element of the crime.69 
The defendant lost at trial and received a mandatory minimum sentence 
of 185 to 360 months.70 
In sum, Frye and Lafler extended the scope of the right to counsel 
“critical stage” to the plea-bargaining process.71 After these cases, the 
Sixth Amendment extends to “pretrial critical stages” that are part of a 
criminal proceeding where “defendants [could not] be presumed to make 
critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”72 In Lafler, The Court 
determined plea-negotiations were critical stages based on pragmatic 
considerations.73 Specifically, “[t]he right to adequate assistance of 
counsel cannot be defined or enforced without taking account of the 
central role plea bargaining plays in securing convictions and determining 
sentences.”74 Today’s criminal justice system is largely one of pleas, 
which made protecting rights during plea negotiations more critical than 
at trial.75 
Once the Court established the right to counsel for plea-bargaining, 
both defendants successfully demonstrated prejudice resulting from 
counsels’ actions during the negotiation process.76 When an offer to plea-
bargain is made, “a defendant has the right to effective assistance of 
counsel in considering whether to accept it.”77 If that right is denied, a 
defendant must show prejudice to be entitled to relief.78 In order to show 
prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that 
(1) “they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been 
afforded effective assistance of counsel;” (2) the plea would not have been 
cancelled by the prosecution or rejected by the trial court; and (3) “the 
end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable” by 
pleading to a lesser charge or receiving less prison time.79 With respect to 
the third factor, “any amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth 
 
 68. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 161 (2012). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 165; Frye, 566 U.S. at 144. 
 72. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165; see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 144-45 (“The art of negotiation is at least 
as nuanced as the art of trial advocacy and it presents questions further removed from immediate judicial 
supervision.”) (citations omitted). 
 73. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144; see also Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170 (“Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”). 
 76. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 174; Frye, 566 U.S. at 150. 
 77. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 168. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Frye, 566 U.S. 147. 
9
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Amendment significance.”80  
2. The Introduction of the “Attachment” Requirement 
In Kirby, a plurality opinion denied the right to counsel for the 
defendant during a police lineup that occurred before formal, adversary 
proceedings had been initiated.81 The Court previously determined in 
Wade82 that post-indictment lineups were critical stages where the right 
to counsel was required by the Constitution.83 The defendant in Kirby was 
arrested based on what was deemed a credible complaint from a victim of 
a robbery, and evidence corroborating the complaint was found on the 
defendant’s person when he was arrested.84 On the same day of the arrest, 
police summoned the victim to the police station where he identified the 
defendant as the man who robbed the victim two days earlier.85 
The plurality briefly traced the history of the Sixth Amendment and 
prior decisions to reach the conclusion that the right to counsel “attaches” 
only at or after adversary proceedings had been initiated against the 
accused.86 After noting the difference of opinion among members of the 
Court in this area, the plurality stated that all of the cases involving the 
right to counsel occurred during the arraignment or after formal charges 
had been brought.87 The often-quoted language in Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence comes from the Kirby plurality, in which the Court stated 
the significance of a bright-line attachment rule: 
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere 
formalism. It is the starting point for our whole system of adversary 
criminal justice system. For it is only then that the government has 
committed itself to prosecute and only then that the adverse positions of 
the government and defendant have solidified.88 
The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the right to an 
attorney had attached because it did not want to interfere with “routine 
police investigation[s].”89 Lastly, the Court noted the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment would protect the defendant’s 
 
 80. Id. (quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2000)).  
 81. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
 82. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 83. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 683. 
 84. Id. at 684. 
 85. Id. at 684-85. 
 86. Id. at 688. 
 87. Id. at 689; but see id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Expressing serious reservations about 
the plurality reducing prior cases’ holdings, that protect the right to counsel, to support its formulation of 
the bright-line attachment rule). 
 88. Id. at 689 (plurality opinion). 
 89. See id. at 690. 
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constitutional rights during the police investigation.90 
Five years after Kirby, the Supreme Court addressed the attachment 
issue in Brewer v. Williams.91 In Brewer, an arrest warrant was issued for 
the defendant based on his suspected involvement in a fourteen-year-old 
girl’s disappearance.92 The defendant hired an attorney, turned himself in, 
and agreed to be transported 160 miles to the county where the arrest 
warrant originated.93 An agreement was made between law enforcement 
officers, the defendant, and his attorney that no questioning would take 
place while he was being transported.94 However, the officers violated 
this agreement and elicited incriminating statements, which violated the 
defendant’s right to counsel.95 The Court determined there was “no 
doubt” adversarial proceedings had been initiated and the defendant’s 
right to counsel was violated during the transport-interrogation.96 After 
noting the difference of opinions on the scope of the Sixth Amendment, 
the Court concluded the right had attached but did not make reference to 
the bright-line attachment rule announced in Kirby.97 
Although not referenced in Brewer, Kirby’s formalistic approach was 
adopted by a majority of the Court in United States v. Gouveia.98 In 
Gouveia, the defendants were already serving a prison sentence when they 
became suspects in the murder of a fellow inmate.99 The defendants were 
placed in administrative segregation for nineteen months until a federal 
grand jury indicted them.100 At the arraignment proceeding, counsel was 
appointed.101 The Gouveia defendants alleged, among other claims, that 
their right to counsel was violated during the administrative 
segregation.102 The Court held that no violation occurred because the 
Sixth Amendment right had not attached yet.103 After highlighting the 
rationale underlying the right to counsel, the Court relied on Kirby and 
subsequent cases to reach its conclusion.104 Primarily, the Court focused 
on the need for counsel when an accused is confronted by a professional, 
 
 90. See id. at 691. 
 91. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 391. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 393, 399. 
 96. Id. at 399. 
 97. See id. 
 98. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984). 
 99. Id. at 183. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 183-84. 
 103. Id. at 188. 
 104. Id. 
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organized adversary.105 Since appointing an attorney while the defendants 
were in administrative segregation would not further the Sixth 
Amendment’s purpose, the bright-line attachment rule was properly 
invoked to deny the defendants the protections of the Sixth 
Amendment.106 
C. Circuits Deviating from the Bright-Line Attachment Rule  
Several circuits have followed a more pragmatic approach – one that 
does not exclusively rely on the formal initiation of judicial proceedings 
– to determine whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has 
“attached” to a defendant in a particular case. Yet, the majority in Turner 
denied the existence of a circuit split on this issue and dismissed the value 
and reasoning of this alternative approach.107 
In Roberts v. Maine, the First Circuit demonstrated this pragmatic 
approach when it supported the proposition that a right to counsel may 
attach before the formal charges are brought.108 In Roberts, the defendant 
was stopped by the police for driving with a suspended license. He was 
later arrested because the arresting officer suspected the defendant was 
driving while intoxicated.109 Under the relevant Maine statute, the 
defendant had the option to submit to or refuse chemical testing to 
determine intoxication level. The defendant’s refusal, however, could be 
used against him in subsequent judicial proceedings.110 The defendant 
refused to submit to testing, was convicted at trial, and appealed his 
sentence. He alleged the state’s refusal to allow him to consult with his 
attorney to discuss whether to submit to testing violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.111 
The First Circuit in Roberts ultimately concluded no Sixth Amendment 
violation occurred, but not before discussing the Circuit’s position on the 
“attachment” issue. Specifically, the court recognized that the right to 
counsel might attach before any formal charges are made, before an 
indictment or arraignment, if the government were to “cross[] the 
constitutionally significant divide from fact-finder to adversary.”112 The 
court noted the right would only attach in particular circumstances, but it 
was not present here because the police were still performing their 
 
 105. See id. at 189. 
 106. See id. at 191. 
 107. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert, denied, No. 18-106, 
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019). 
 108. Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1995). 
 109. Id. at 1290. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1291 (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
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investigatory function and the state had not crossed the “constitutionally 
significant divide.”113 
In United States v. Larkin, the Seventh Circuit reached a conclusion 
similar to the First Circuit’s position in Roberts. There, the defendant was 
incarcerated in a state penitentiary for his involvement in an armed 
robbery.114 While incarcerated, and three months before he was indicted 
by a federal grand jury, the government mistakenly compelled Larkin to 
appear in a police lineup, prior to the grand jury compelling him to do 
so.115 During the lineup, witnesses identified Larkin as the person 
involved in the bank robbery.116 The government refused to grant Larkin’s 
request for counsel to be present during the lineup, and the witnesses’ 
identification of the defendant in a pre-indictment lineup was almost 
exclusively the basis for conviction at trial.117 
On appeal, Larkin argued that the state denied him the right to 
counsel.118 The lineup in question occurred three months prior to Larkin’s 
indictment.119 The court began its analysis by finding that the right to 
counsel “presumptively does not attach to pre-indictment lineups.”120 The 
court further stated a “defendant may rebut this presumption by 
demonstrating that, despite the absence of formal adversary judicial 
proceedings, the government had crossed the constitutionally significant 
divide from fact-finder to adversary.”121 The defendant made no such 
showing the government changed its position and therefore did not rebut 
the presumption.122 The court took special notice of the fact there was no 
valid reason to deny Larkin’s request for counsel.123  
Lastly, the Third Circuit has also applied a pragmatic interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent.124 In Matteo v. SCI Albion, the defendant was 
convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and several other charges.125 
While Matteo was in jail, police taped two conversations between the 
defendant and a friend who lent him a rifle used in the murder; Matteo 
gave the friend explicit instructions about where to find the murder 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. United States. v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 967 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 115. Id. at 968. 
 116. Id. at 967. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 969. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 970 (“It bears repeating that ‘counsel can hardly impede legitimate law enforcement; on 
the contrary ... law enforcement may be assisted by preventing the infiltration of taint[.]’” (quoting United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 238 (1967))). 
 124. Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 892-3 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 125. Id. at 880. 
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weapon.126 The defendant argued the taped conversation and subsequent 
discovery of the murder weapon violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.127 
At the time of Matteo’s telephone conversations, he had already been 
arrested, incarcerated for more than a week, undergone preliminary 
arraignment, and retained an attorney.128 After enumerating the standard 
formal proceedings found in Kirby, the court stated that the right may also 
attach at earlier stages.129 Specifically, the “crucial point is that the 
defendant is guaranteed the protection of counsel” when he is faced with 
the prosecutorial forces of organized society.130 The Third Circuit 
determined that Matteo was confronted with organized resources of an 
ongoing police investigation, and the officers were aware he was 
represented; therefore, the court found that the right to counsel had 
attached.131 Instead of using the bright-line test, the court conducted a 
fact-specific inquiry to hold the right to counsel attached for Matteo.132 
III. DISCUSSION 
Cases involving the right to counsel have consistently produced tension 
among Supreme Court Justices. In the decades following the Court’s 
decision in Kirby, lower courts have been forced to decide whether the 
spirit of the Sixth Amendment or the letter of the law should guide their 
analyses. This Part first argues that the rigid attachment approach used by 
the Turner majority is not as “crystal clear” as it suggested. Second, this 
Part shows how other circuits’ Sixth Amendment analyses rebut the 
Turner majority’s assertion that no circuit split exists on this issue. And 
lastly, this Part argues that Turner’s right to counsel attached during pre-
indictment plea negotiations through a proper understanding and analysis 
of Kirby and its progeny.  
A. The Caselaw is not as “firmly established” as the Turner 
Majority Claimed 
The dissent in Turner correctly noted the flaw in the majority’s 
certainty in dismissing Turner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
 
 126. Id. at 883. 
 127. Id. at 892. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  at 892. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 893. 
 132. See id.; see also United States v. Giamo, 665 F. App’x 154 (3d Cir. 2016) (applying the Frye-
Lafler analysis to pre-indictment plea negotiations). 
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Contrary to the Turner majority’s assertion that caselaw is “firmly 
established” in favor of a bright-line formal attachment rule, the court was 
“wrong both about the clarity of [prior cases] and the substance [the 
Supreme Court] find[s] clear.”133 Indeed, the formalistic approach 
announced in Kirby could not garner support from a majority of Justices 
and has continued to divide the Court in the four-decades since its 
plurality opinion. 
1. Kirby’s Foundation and Rationale 
Kirby could not receive support from a majority of justices because the 
plurality opinion exceeded the scope of the precedent it relied on. The 
plurality in Kirby precluded a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
during a pre-indictment lineup, despite the right being extended to post-
indictment lineups in Wade and Gilbert, decided just five years earlier.134 
However, the two cases cited by the plurality do not hold formal judicial 
proceedings are a necessary condition.135 Rather, Wade and Gilbert 
“happened to involve postindictment confrontations” and “nothing at all 
turned upon that particular circumstance.”136 Perhaps even more 
indicative of how Kirby’s “attachment” rule deviated from previous 
caselaw is how lower courts interpreted Wade and Gilbert. Since they 
were decided, every United States Court of Appeals that was faced with 
the issue had applied Wade and Gilbert to pre-indictment 
confrontations.137  
Kirby also undermined Supreme Court precedent by failing to engage 
in a historical and factual analysis to reach its conclusion. In Wade, the 
Court summarized how Sixth Amendment jurisprudence evolved since it 
first extended the right to counsel for a pre-trial proceeding in Powell. 138 
Wade concluded that Powell and its succeeding cases required the Court 
to “scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused” and determine 
whether “substantial prejudice to the defendant’s rights” would follow 
 
 133. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 980 (6th Cir. 2018) (Stranch, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Rothgery v. Gillepsie County 554 U.S. 191, 211 (2008)), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. 
LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019). 
 134. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 683 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
 135. See id. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id.; see also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 195 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[Wade] 
illustrates how Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has turned not on the formal initiation of judicial 
proceedings, but rather on the nature of the confrontation between the authorities and the citizen”). 
 137. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 704, n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Wilson v. 
Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[S]urely the assistance of counsel, now established as an 
absolute post-indictment right does not arise or attach because of the return of an indictment. The 
confrontation of a lineup . . . cannot have a constitutional distinction based upon the lodging of a formal 
charge.”). 
 138. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). 
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without access to counsel.139 Kirby, decided only five years later, 
concluded that Powell and its progeny stand only for the notion a person’s 
right to counsel “attaches only at or after” judicial proceedings are 
initiated.140 Any prior decisions that deviated from this narrow 
interpretation were dismissed as being inapplicable or limited to its own 
facts.141 
Prior to Kirby, every “critical stage” occurred after formal judicial 
proceedings began, which was not relevant until Kirby added the 
“attachment” prong as a necessary condition that must be satisfied to 
invoke the Sixth Amendment. In Stovall, decided the same day as Wade 
and Gilbert, the Court summarized those cases to stand for the proposition 
“that the confrontation is a ‘critical stage,’ and that counsel is required at 
all confrontations.”142 Similarly, in Coleman, the Court found a “critical 
stage” was sufficient to trigger the right to counsel.143 Coleman was 
decided based on the spirit of the law: its reasoning flowed logically from 
Powell through the Court’s decision in Wade.144 Specifically, the right to 
counsel was extended to the defendant in Coleman because the “guiding 
hand of counsel” was “essential to protect[ing] the indigent accused 
against an erroneous or improper prosecution.”145 The Court never 
premised its decision on whether the defendant had been indicted.  
When Kirby was decided, it undermined the principled foundation of 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and reversed the logic of how claims 
invoking the right to counsel are analyzed. The plurality reduced decades 
of precedent centered around protecting the accused from the state in 
criminal prosecutions with a single, conclusory statement.146 Powell and 
its subsequent cases did not stand for the proposition that the right to 
counsel attaches “only at or after the time” formal proceedings began.147 
Rather, the caselaw “firmly establish[ed]” that if the accused is faced with 
an organized prosecution and the right to counsel would help protect the 
spirit of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution exists to prevent against 
injustice.148 The right to counsel in prior decisions was not conditioned 
 
 139. Id.; see also id. at 226 (“It is central to that principle that in addition to counsel's presence at 
trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the 
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the 
accused's right to a fair trial.”). 
 140. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688. 
 141. Id. at 689 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966)). 
 142. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967). 
 143. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10. (1970). 
 144. See id. at 7-9. 
 145. Id. at 14. 
 146. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984).  
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on an arbitrary formality. Instead, the right was extended when the 
defendant could show the state had shifted from investigator to an 
accuser, because that is the sole purpose of the right to counsel.149 The 
fact that these “critical stages” occurred at or after a formal proceeding is 
wholly irrelevant. Moreover, Kirby was not cited by the majority when 
the same issue was decided a year later because its reasoning was such an 
egregious constitutional outlier.150 
2. Kirby’s Application in Subsequent Cases 
One year after Kirby, a majority of Supreme Court Justices in Ash 
returned to the Powell-Wade Sixth Amendment analysis.151 In Ash, the 
majority undertook an extensive historical analysis and traced the 
developments in Sixth Amendment caselaw. First, it noted how changing 
patterns of criminal procedure and investigation required extending the 
right to events before trial.152 The right to counsel expanded “when new 
contexts appear presenting the same dangers that gave birth initially to the 
right itself.”153 A notable absence from the Ash majority is the holding in 
Kirby.154  Indeed, Justice Stewart’s separate concurring opinion was the 
only mention of the supposed “firmly established” rule in the Supreme 
Court’s comprehensive analysis of Sixth Amendment caselaw.155 
Gouveia finally incorporated Kirby’s holding into its majority opinion 
in 1984.156 The “narrow issue” in this case was whether the Sixth 
Amendment requires appointment of counsel to prisoners in 
administrative detention for alleged criminal involvement while under 
detention.157 Again, the Court exaggerated Kirby’s weight in Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence and applied Kirby to a fact pattern that does 
not implicate the right to counsel. 
 First, the Court said Kirby was “confirmed” in subsequent cases, 
which is a mischaracterization.158 Moreover, the Goveia majority 
 
 149. The plurality’s final word in Kirby specifically noted that petitioner’s rights would be better 
protected by the fifth amendment because it prevents police from suggestive police lineups. See Kirby, 
406 U.S. at 691. 
 150. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306-13 (Analyzing the history of the Sixth Amendment, 
citing twelve different Supreme Court cases and three commentators, but did not mention Kirby or the 
‘formal initiation of criminal proceedings’ once). 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. at 310. 
 153. Id. at 311. 
 154. Id. at 306-13. 
 155. Id. at 321. (Stewart, J., concurring); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality 
opinion). 
 156. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984). 
 157. Id. at 185, n.1. 
 158. Id. at 188. 
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extended, without justification, the Court’s decision in Brewer.159 Brewer 
first noted the conflict regarding various precedents on the attachment 
issue.160 Then, because there was no reasonable argument to contradict 
that the right had attached, the Court simply conceded that “[w]hatever 
else it may mean, the right to counsel . . . means at least that a person is 
entitled to the help of a lawyer at or sometime after judicial proceedings 
have been initiated.”161 The second case cited by the majority was another 
plurality opinion162; the other two citations offered applied Kirby but did 
not decide whether the right could attach at an earlier point.163  
Second, the Gouveia majority invoked Kirby in a case where the facts 
did not warrant the sweeping conclusion that the right to counsel can only 
be invoked after formal proceedings were initiated. In Gouveia, the 
defendants were held for nineteen months in administrative detention 
before being indicted.164 The defendants’ chief argument was a Fifth 
Amendment due-process violation, their secondary argument was a Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial violation, and their final argument was that they 
argued a violation of the right to counsel.165 Yet the Court invoked Kirby’s 
formalistic attachment rule when the rationale for the right to counsel was 
not implicated by the case. Indeed, the majority rebuked the Court of 
Appeals for even suggesting counsel could be useful: 
[T]he Court of Appeals must have concluded, quite illogically we believe, 
. . . that the inmate or his counsel could begin an effective investigation of 
the crime within the restricted prison walls before even being able to 
discover the nature of the Government’s case.166 
Overall, the case law and application of the formal attachment method 
used by the Court contradicts the underlying principles of the Sixth 
Amendment, and bright-line attachment is found to be a necessary 
condition only when dismissing superfluous attempts by defendants to 
invoke the right to counsel. 
 
 159. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgement). 
 160. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (“There has occasionally been a difference of 
opinion within the court as to the peripheral scope of this constitutional right.”). 
 161. Gouviea, 467 U.S. at 193 (emphasis in original) (citing [Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398]) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in judgement). 
 162. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 163. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 193, n.3 (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-70 (satisfying Kirby’s 
formal language where defendant was indicted and already had an appointed attorney); Moore v. Illinois, 
434 U.S. 220, 226-27 (satisfying Kirby’s formal language where state conceded a preliminary hearing 
was initiation of adverse criminal proceedings)). 
 164. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 183. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 191. 
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B. Courts of Appeal Look Beyond the Bright-Line Attachment Rule 
In Turner, the majority opinion unequivocally denied the existence of 
a circuit split by mischaracterizing the decisions reached in other 
circuits.167 In opinions cited in Turner, as well as others overlooked by 
the majority, other circuits decline to extend the right to counsel to earlier 
stages because the government had not yet solidified its position as an 
adversary, not based on adherence to a bright-line rule.168 More 
specifically, the reason other circuits have not adopted the bright-line rule 
is because of their adherence to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence – not in 
spite of it. 
For example, the First Circuit’s decision in Roberts, which was cited 
in Turner, did not rely on the bright-line attachment rule to deny Sixth 
Amendment protections.169 The defendant claimed he was denied the 
right to counsel when police refused to let him speak to his attorney before 
submitting to a field-sobriety test.170 The defendant pursued a frivolous 
argument that since refusing to take a sobriety test carried a mandatory 
sentence, the right to counsel had attached, but the court concluded this 
was not sufficient to change a normal investigatory procedure into an 
adversarial proceeding.171  
The court disposed the claim because the police had not yet crossed the 
“constitutionally significant divide from fact-finder to adversary.”172 
Indeed, the decision to bring formal charges depended on the outcome of 
the sobriety test.173 Instead of rejecting Roberts’s strained attempt to 
invoke Sixth Amendment protections under the bright-line attachment 
rule, the First Circuit engaged in a principled analysis to determine 
whether he was subject to intricacies of the adversarial system.174 More 
importantly, the First Circuit found the investigation violated the Due 
Process Clause without an unwarranted mischaracterization of the Sixth 
 
 167. Compare Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied, 
No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019).(“Because the Supreme Court has not extended the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to any point before the initiation of adversary judicial criminal 
proceedings, we may not do so”); with Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Overall, 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment appears to allow for few exceptions to the bright-
line rule that the right to counsel does not attach until the government initiates official proceedings by 
making a formal charge.”). 
 168. See Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1290 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 
964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 169. Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1291. 
 170. Id. at 1290. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1291 (“Overall, Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment appears to allow 
for few exceptions to the bright-line rule.”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1290 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986)). 
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Amendment’s attachment question.175   
The Seventh Circuit followed a similar analysis in Larkin and rejected 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim. There, the government 
mistakenly compelled Larkin to participate in a lineup prior to compelling 
him to simply appear before the grand jury.176 Similar to the defendant in 
Kirby, Larkin was subjected to a lineup before an indictment on his 
federal charges were returned by the grand jury.177 Unlike Kirby, the 
Seventh Circuit did not dispose of Larkin’s claim with a bright-line 
attachment rule. Instead, the court concluded Larkin had a chance to rebut 
the presumption that the right to counsel does not attach for pre-
indictment police lineups.178 Since the defendant did not show that the 
government “crossed the constitutionally significant divide,” the right to 
counsel had not yet attached for him.179 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Larkin is a strong indication that circuits are divided the attachment issue. 
The court expressly stated that if the defendant can demonstrate that the 
government had changed its position from fact-finder to accuser, the right 
to counsel exists “despite the absence of formal adversary judicial 
proceedings.”180 
Further, the Third Circuit found that the “crucial point is that the 
defendant is guaranteed the protection of counsel from the moment he 
‘finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, 
and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal 
law.’”181 In Giamo, the Third Circuit realized pre-indictment plea 
negotiations were sufficient to trigger the right to counsel and applied a 
Frye-Lafler analysis to determine whether the defendant’s rights were 
violated.182 Similar to Turner, the defendant in Giamo was offered a pre-
indictment plea deal that would dismiss charges carrying mandatory 
minimum sentences, and he alleged his counsel was deficient in relaying 
 
 175. Id. at 1291.  
 176. United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. (citing United States v. Rosen, 487 F.Supp.2d 721, 733 (E.D. Vir. 2007) (“In addition to 
these cases, several district courts have concluded that a right to counsel existed in pre-indictment plea 
negotiations. United States v. Fernandez, 2000 WL 534449 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 
F.Supp. 1312, 1319-20 (D. Del.1981); United States v. Busse, 814 F.Supp. 760, 763 (E.D.Wis.1993)); 
(“These cases were not followed, however, in United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609 (6th Cir.2000), where 
the Sixth Circuit reluctantly (and unpersuasively) concluded that the right to counsel does not attach in 
pre-indictment plea negotiations, despite the fact that in the circumstances there presented, the adversarial 
posture of the parties had clearly solidified because the defendant had been offered a specific plea 
bargain.””) (emphasis added)). 
 181. Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 892 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Kirby v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). 
 182. United States v. Giamo, 665 F. App’x 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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the prosecution’s offer.183 Unlike Turner, Giamo’s claim failed because 
he could not show that he would have accepted the government’s offer: 
not because his right to counsel had not attached yet.184 
C. Applying a Reasoned Sixth Amendment Analysis to Turner’s 
Claim  
The crux of the Supreme Court’s attachment rule is that the 
Constitution does not require a defendant be appointed counsel until the 
government formally initiates a criminal prosecution. However, the 
formal initiation of judicial proceedings is not a workable standard in 
cases involving pre-indictment plea negotiations. First, this subpart 
argues that, in Turner, the government shifted from its role as a fact-finder 
to the Turner’s adversary. It applies the reasoning from Supreme Court 
cases applying the bright-line attachment rule to show that the 
government can shift to a defendant’s adversary without formal charges 
being filed. Second, this subpart argues that formal attachment denies the 
right to counsel at a stage in which the defendant’s rights are substantially 
prejudiced. During pre-indictment plea negotiations, a defendant needs 
assistance of counsel to navigate complex substantive and procedural 
components of criminal law. 
1. The Government Shifted from Fact-Finder to Adversary 
In support of the court’s decision on the attachment issue in Turner, the 
court improperly distinguished between critical stages that occur before 
and after the right to counsel attaches. Specifically, the court cited 
precedent that held no right to counsel exists during pre-indictment 
lineups and interrogations, whereas the right is extended when those 
events occur post-indictment.185 
 In Kirby and Moran, the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel 
does not attach for pre-indictment lineups and interrogations.186 The 
underlying facts and timeline of the events in both cases are 
fundamentally distinguishable from those in Turner. In Kirby, the police 
arrested the defendant for a robbery he committed the day before and 
brought the victim to the police station to identify the assailant.187 In 
Moran, on the night the defendant was arrested, he admitted to 
 
 183. Id. at 157. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 2018), cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 
U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019). 
 186. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
 187. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 684-85. 
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committing the murder and unsuccessfully attempted to suppress his 
confession because no right to counsel attached.188 Clearly, the 
government had not yet “committed itself to prosecute” in these cases.189 
The pre-indictment lineup and interrogation both took place on the same 
day of the arrest, and the police were deeply engaged in the fact-finding, 
investigatory stage. 
In Kirby, the Supreme Court expressly rejected interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment in a way that interfered with a “routine police 
investigation.”190 In Turner, when the ADA engaged in plea negotiations 
with Turner prior to his federal indictment, there was no ongoing police 
investigation and the government had already committed itself to 
prosecuting.191 Turner’s arrest was the result of a joint state-federal task 
force and had already been indicted on state charges resulting from the 
same conduct.192 Within two days, the police obtained a typed, signed 
confession from Turner, a positive identification by a witness in a lineup, 
and video surveillance showing Turner committing these armed 
robberies.193 Turner was incarcerated from the time he was arrested on the 
state aggravated robbery charges until the subsequent plea deal with the 
ADA was executed.194 In sum, when the ADA offered a plea deal before 
Turner’s indictment, law enforcement’s investigation had concluded and 
“the adverse positions of government and defendant ha[d] solidified.”195  
The ADA made Turner a formal offer of fifteen years’ imprisonment 
for charges that resulted from the same conduct as his state charges, which 
supports the claim that the government had shifted from its fact-finding 
function to Turner’s adversary.196 As argued in the Turner dissent, 
prosecutors may only offer a plea deal if they plan to bring charges or 
have a factual or legal basis to do so.197 The record did not indicate that 
 
 188. Moran v. Burbine, 475, U.S. 412, 431-32.  
 189. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689. 
 190. Id. at 698. 
 191. Turner v. United States, 848 F.3d 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2017), aff’d on reh’g, Turner v. United 
States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 
2019). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Turner Compl. No. 07136332 (Oct. 5, 2007). 
 194. Turner had four separate case numbers in Shelby County, Tennessee state court: Tennessee v. 
Turner, No. 08 03612-08620401 (June 3, 2008) ($150,000); Tennessee v. Turner, No 08 01145-08606637 
(Feb. 19, 2008) ($100,000); Tennessee v. Turner, No. 08 01146 07136332 (Feb. 19, 2008) ($200,000); 
Tennessee v. Turner, No. 08 01147-07136332 (Feb. 19, 2008) ($200,000). His combined bond was 
$650,000 and Shelby County public records do not indicate it was posted in the financial section, though 
it has a record of Turner paying other court costs. 
 195. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 698. 
 196. Turner, 885 F.3d at 952; see Turner 885 F.3d at 954-55. 
 197. Turner, 885 F.3d at 981 (Stranch, J., dissenting) (citing Cf. Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice 
Standards for the Prosecution Function, Standard 2-5.6(g) (4th ed. 2015; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27. 430 (2017)). 
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police undertook any additional efforts to investigate Turner’s crimes, but 
even if police continued to investigate, extending a formal plea offer 
“signals an individual has transitioned from a mere suspect to an 
accused.”198 Indeed, had Turner promptly accepted the pre-indictment 
plea deal, his conviction would have been based solely on facts already 
possessed by the police and presented to the ADA. 
The logical conclusion is that the right to counsel attached when the 
ADA presented a formal plea offer to Turner. If Turner’s case was 
presented to the Courts of Appeals mentioned above, it is likely that 
Turner’s facts would be sufficient to cross the “constitutionally 
significant divide” that triggers the right to counsel.199 The First and 
Seventh Circuits cast doubt on the strict adherence to a bright-line 
attachment rule by interpreting Supreme Court decisions to allow the right 
to attach before initiating official proceedings.200 The reason for rejecting 
the defendants’ claims that their right to counsel had attached was that the 
police were still heavily involved in their respective investigations. In 
these cases, the facts controlled the analysis—not strict adherence to 
bright-line rules. 
2. The Consequences of Pre-Indictment Plea Negotiations Require 
Effective Assistance of Counsel  
Even in Supreme Court cases relying on the bright-line attachment rule, 
whether the government’s adverse position is solidified and the accused 
is “immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal 
law” is still relevant in the analysis.201 When the Court finds that the right 
to counsel has not yet attached in pre-indictment proceedings, the reason 
is largely because the two previously stated factors were not satisfied.202 
However, pre-indictment plea negotiations are fundamentally 
distinguishable from other pre-indictment proceedings because of their 
exposure to the intricacies of the legal system and their ability to 
definitively resolve criminal charges against an accused. 
For a criminal defendant to meaningfully evaluate a pre-indictment 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 200. Id.; Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1290 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 201. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 (1972)). 
 202. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (holding a pre-indictment lineup, that occurred the same 
day as the defendant’s arrest was insufficient for right to counsel to attach); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412 (1986) (holding the right to counsel did not attach to an interrogation that took place the night the 
defendant was arrested for burglary and subsequently confessed to a murder that occurred a year earlier); 
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (holding no right attached during 19 month administrative 
detention). 
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plea deal, he or she would have to understand the charges, potential 
punishment, potential defenses, the strength of the government’s case, 
and the risks of proceeding to trial.203 In Turner’s case, “[e]valuating the 
offer also required fluency in the complexities of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, a task that is challenging even to experienced 
attorneys.”204 When plea-negotiations take place before a formal 
indictment, the accused is not invoking the Sixth Amendment to provide 
a pre-indictment private investigator,205 interfere with the police’s 
investigatory function,206 or even prevent illegitimate law enforcement 
practices before an indictment.207 Rather, the accused is seeking effective 
assistance of counsel to navigate the complex legal system that “is for the 
most part a system of pleas.”208  
Denying the right to counsel during pre-indictment plea negotiations 
preclude effective assistance during the “accused’s only adversarial 
confrontation.”209 Pre-indictment plea negotiations take place in at least 
twenty-percent of federal criminal prosecutions.210 In federal court, one 
of every five criminal defendants’ “exposure to the criminal justice 
system” starts with the prosecutor and “close[s] in the prison system.”211 
And although pre-indictment plea deals are becoming increasingly more 
common, the majority in Turner “insulates those confrontations” from 
constitutional protections and review.212 This is not meant to discount the 
desirability of these plea bargains; rather, it is to ensure that the 
government cannot streamline its criminal prosecutions by taking 
advantage of those who are unaware of their rights.  
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari on Turner to correct 
the Sixth Circuit’s outdated interpretation of the right to counsel. The 
right to counsel should attach when a prosecutor extends a formal plea 
 
 203. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 981 (6th Cir. 2018) en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019). (Stranch, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 191 (“[O]ur cases have never suggested that the purpose of the right to 
counsel is to provide a defendant with a preindictment private investigator[.]”) (Emphasis added). 
 206. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 179-80 (1985) (“[T]o exclude evidence pertaining to charges 
as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained, 
simply because other charges were pending at that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest 
in the investigation of criminal activities.”). 
 207. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 691 (“When a person has not been formally charged with a criminal offense, 
[the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] strike[] the appropriate constitutional 
balance between the right of a suspect to be protected from prejudicial procedures . . . and purposeful 
investigation of unsolved crime.”). 
 208. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). 
 209. Turner, 885 F.3d at 982 (Stranch, J., dissenting). 
 210. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at *4, n.1, Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018) 
en banc, No. 18-106 (July 20, 2018).   
 211. Turner, 885 F.3d at 982 (Stranch, J., dissenting). 
 212. Id. at 983. 
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offer to an accused, even if he has not been formally indicted. Upon a 
finding that the right to counsel attaches after the government extends a 
formal plea offer, the Frye-Lafler analysis used for post-indictment plea 
deals would be readily transferrable. 
 Under the Frye-Lafler test, the Sixth Circuit, on remand, would likely 
have found that Turner received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, 
he would be able to show that he would have accepted the pre-indictment 
plea offer but-for the deficient assistance of his counsel. Turner accepted 
his state plea deal.213  And he promptly accepted the post-indictment plea 
offer negotiated by his new attorney, despite receiving a longer prison 
sentence. 214 The prejudice prong of the Frye-Lafler anaylsis would have 
also been satisfied because Turner received ten additional years’ 
incarceration as a result of not accepting the ADA’s initial plea. 215 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision in Turner 
improperly deferred to Kirby’s bright-line attachment rule and precluded 
Turner from bringing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel during 
pre-indictment plea negotiations. Contrary to the Turner majority’s 
assertion that Kirby requires the conclusion reached by the court, 
substantial caselaw exists to demonstrate the existence of a circuit split 
and reluctance among the lower courts to use the bright-line rule as a cop-
out when deciding close cases of whether the right to counsel attached. 
The Sixth Amendment, properly understood and applied, should extend 
to prevent the accused from having to accept a pre-indictment plea deal 
without the protection of counsel in order to avoid a harsher prison 
sentence from a post-indictment plea with counsel. 
Pre-indictment plea negotiations operate in a constitutional “blind-
spot” between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. The negotiations take 
place after the Fifth Amendment’s protections end and before the Sixth 
Amendment’s protections begin. Since the Court refuses to act in the 
interest of the accused, the accused is not afforded any protection from 
the constitution against the organized forces of the government. When the 
accused is presented with a formal plea offer – a fixed sentence for 
pleading guilty to specific charges – the interest served by providing 
 
 213. Turner v. United States, 848 F.3d 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2017), aff’d on reh’g, Turner v. United 
States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 
(June 24, 2019). 
 214. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert, denied, No. 18-106, 
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019). 
 215. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 157 (2012) (quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 
203 (2000)) (any amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth Amendment significance. 
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counsel to the accused is substantial, and a countervailing governmental 
interest has yet to be presented to the Court. Instead, the government relies 
on the Court’s deference to a bright-line attachment rule as a cop-out, a 
bright-line rule that should be overturned. 
 As a result of the Supreme Court denying certiorari on Turner’s 
attachment question, lower courts will continue to deprive the accused of 
the right to counsel during this critical stage. As prosecutors utilize new 
means to secure guilty pleas prior to formal indictment, the bright-line 
attachment approach is inapplicable and will deny the right to effective 
assistance of counsel at the only adversarial stage of the criminal process. 
By continuing to rely on this cop-out, the Court leaves the accused 
without the resources necessary to face the government in our adversarial 
system, and the accused is tasked with representing him or herself against 
the United States government without the slightest chance of prevailing.  
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